LUZON SURETY CO - v - PANAGUITON, VELASCO
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS
PANAGUITON, ET AL., defendants, CUSTODIA J. VDA. DE VELASCO, as Administratrix
of the Intestate Estate of ANGELES VELASCO, defendant-appellant.
FIRST
DIVISION, G.R. No. L-26054, July 21,
1978, GUERRERO, J.
Doctrine:
A fundamental part of due process
is the essential requisite that a party should be given an opportunity to be
heard by notifying or informing him or his counsel as to when such a hearing
will take place, affording him reasonable notice of the time fixed for the
hearing or trial of the case.
Facts:
On April 1955, plaintiff, as surety, and defendant Jesus Panaguiton, as
principal, executed jointly and severally a surety bond for P10,000.00 in favor
of the International Tobacco Co., Inc. to secure the payment of all his
monetary liabilities, as well as the faithful performance of his obligation to
said Company. In consideration of the execution by plaintiff of the said Surety
Bond, there were, in turn, executed in the latter's favor an Indemnity
Agreement by defendant Panaguiton, and others.
For failure of defendant Panaguiton to comply with the terms and
conditions of the Surety Bond, the International Tobacco Co., Inc. filed Civil
Case at CFI Manila against plaintiff and said Panaguiton. A decision was rendered sentencing the
defendants therein to pay to the International Tobacco Co., Inc. Plaintiff paid to the International Tobacco
Co., Inc. and that notwithstanding demands made by plaintiff on defendants for
the reimbursement, said defendants have failed and refused to make said
reimbursement.
On July 1960, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering defendants to pay plaintiff. On October 1960, defendant-appellant
Custodia J. Vda. de Velasco (administratrix of the estate of the deceased Angeles
Velasco) filed a petition for relief from judgment which states the ff: 1) That
the said decision is a complete nullity for the reason that she was not
notified of the hearing of the case; 2) That if she was duly notified of the
hearing she would be able to show that the Indemnity Agreement was not at all
signed by the deceased Angeles Velasco; and 3) That the petitioning defendant,
not having been represented by legal counsel, was of the mistaken belief that
she has 60 days within which to file a petition for new trial, or
reconsideration or appeal from the decision. After the trial court's denial of her petition for
relief from judgment on December 1960, defendant-appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying her petition for relief, which motion was
also denied, hence the present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court
erred in denying the appellant's petition for relief from judgment without
considering that the decision subject matter of the petition is a complete
nullity in so far as appellant is concerned because she was never notified
of the hearing of the case and was deprived of her day in court.
Ruling:
The defendant-appellant was not notified of the hearings set for March l
and May 13, 1960 is borne by the records. Her name as a party defendant does
not even appear in the list of persons to be given notice of the hearings by
the Clerk of Court. She was, therefore, denied the fundamental right to be
heard, an essential element of procedural due process. In El Banco Español
Filipino vs. Palanca: Due process of law
implies that there must be a court or tribunal clothed with power to hear and
determine the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall have been lawfully
acquired, that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, and that
judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Philippine jurisprudence is replete with decisions of this Court laying
down as a fundamental part of due process the essential requisite that a party
should be given an opportunity to be heard by notifying or informing him or his
counsel as to when such a hearing will take place, affording him reasonable
notice of the time fixed for the hearing or trial of the case.
In the instant case, the trial court had peremptorily rejected
defendant-appellant's petition for relief from judgment, declaring that her failure
to appeal within 30 days from receipt of the decision was fatal to her cause. SC
disagrees with the lower court's ruling. It
is precisely because of the expiration of the period for appeal that she seeks
to avail of the remedy of relief from judgment, alleging that being a layman
and without the benefit of counsel, she was of the mistaken belief that she had
60 days within which to appeal the decision. Such remedy of relief from
judgment is available to her as provided under Rule 38, Sec. 2 and 3, Revised
Rules of Court. The trial court gravely erred in denying appellant'
s petition for relief.
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