PT&T Co. - v - NLRC, DE GUZMAN
[G.R. No. 118978. May 23,
1997]
4.
When
petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in
Baguio City sent to private respondent a memorandum requiring her to explain
the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company’s
policy of not accepting married women for employment.
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
Facts:
1.
Grace de
Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever for consecutive fixed
periods for various employees who were on leave. Under the Reliever Agreement,
her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed
periods.
2.
Private
respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days.
3.
In the
job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose,
she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single
although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
5.
In her
reply letter, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&Ts
policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not
deliberately hidden her true civil status.
6.
Petitioner
nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations, private respondent was
dismissed from the company which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost
of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
7.
Labor
Arbiter Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who
had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by
petitioner. It was apparent that she had been discriminated against on
account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
8.
On appeal
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent
upheld the labor arbiter. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was
modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended
for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not
be condoned.
9.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution hence
this special civil.
Issue: Whether or not the termination of the services of private respondent by
the petitioner is valid.
Held: Negative.
Rationale:
The
Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have
emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted
largely due to our countrys commitment as a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).
It is
recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the
so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of
hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and
assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers,
and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. As put in a case, an
employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business
judgment, all aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.
In the
case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of,
and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor
laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners
assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of
her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were
dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed
acts of dishonesty.
Indeed,
petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against
married women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which
compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was,
however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondents
secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to
recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused.
The
government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that
adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain
terms, as follows:
ART.
136. Stipulation against marriage.
- It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.
Petitioners
policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good
morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom
to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the
individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that
the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions
that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.