PT&T Co. - v - NLRC, DE GUZMAN

[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]
Ponente: REGALADO, J.

Facts:

1.    Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever for consecutive fixed periods for various employees who were on leave. Under the Reliever Agreement, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed periods. 
2.    Private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. 
3.    In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
4.    When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City sent to private respondent a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment.
5.    In her reply letter, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
6.    Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations, private respondent was dismissed from the company which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
7.    Labor Arbiter Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. It was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
8.    On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. 
9.     The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution hence this special civil.

Issue: Whether or not the termination of the services of private respondent by the petitioner is valid.

Held: Negative.

Rationale:

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted largely due to our countrys commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

It is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.

In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondents secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.

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