AQUINO - v - COMELEC
DR. REY B. AQUINO, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
EN BANC | G.R. Nos. 211789-90 | March 17, 2015 |
BRION, J.
Doctrine:
Section 261(h) provides at once the
elements of the offense and its exceptions. The elements are: 1. the making or
causing of a government official or employee’s transfer or detail whatever; 2.
the making or causing of the transfer or detail whatever was made during the
election period; and 3. these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC
approval. The terms transfer and detail are modified by the term whatever such
that "any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or
not in the same office or agency, during the election period is covered by the
prohibition." Any act that occurs or is performed after the antecedent act
of making or causing or those acts performed to carry out an event or result
desired by the antecedent acts, such as the actual or physical act of
transferring, are no longer the concern of the legal prohibition.
Facts:
On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), issued
PhilHealth Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010 (reassignment
order) directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees.
On the same date, Aquino released the reassignment order, via the PHIC’s
intranet service, to all PHIC officers and employees. On January 11, 2010,
Aquino issued an Advisory implementing
the reassignment order. In view of the reassignment order and its directive,
Dean Rudyard A. Avila III, consultant to the Chairman of the Board of PHIC and
former Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors, filed before the COMELEC, a
complaint against Aquino and Melinda C. Mercado, PHIC Officer-in-Charge, Executive
VP and Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in
relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. On February 1, 2010, Adre, Alonto and
Macabato, along with Romeo D. Alberto and Johnny Y. Sychua (PHIC Regional VPs)
likewise filed before the COMELEC a similar complaint for violation of
Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 against Tito M.
Mendiola, PHIC Senior VP for Operations Sector, and Ruben John A. Basa, PHIC
Group VP for Corporate Affairs. These were subsequently consolidated. Aquino
filed a petition before the COMELEC maintaining that PhilHealth SO No.
16-2010 is beyond the coverage of Resolution No. 8737.
The assailed COMELEC resolutions:
1. The October 19, 2012 resolution. The
COMELEC directed its Law Department to file the appropriate information against
Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP
881; it dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint against Mercado, Mendiola,
and Basa.
2. The February 18, 2014 resolution. The
COMELEC affirmed in toto the October 19, 2012 resolution.
The
Petition [Aquino’s Arguments]
1.
COMELEC exceeded its authority to
implement the election laws when, in interpreting Section 261(h) of BP 881, it
added reassignments as a covered offense when the prohibitions speak only of
transfer and detail.
2.
Reassignment order did not violate
Section 261(h) of BP 881 because he issued it on January 8, 2010, or before the
start of the election period on January 10, 2010.
3.
Section 3 of BP 881 fixes the start of
the election period at ninety (90) days before the day of the election, not one
hundred and twenty (120) days before, which the COMELEC set in Resolution No.
8737. Hence, the election period for the May 10, 2010 elections should have
commenced on February 9, 2010, not January 10, 2010.
The
Case for the COMELEC [COMELEC’s, through the Solicitor General, arguments]
1.
The words "transfer" and
"detail" are precisely modified by the word "whatever" such
that any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in
the same office or agency, is covered by the prohibition under Resolution No.
8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. Such personnel action necessarily
includes "reassignment."
2.
Aquino issued the reassignment order
without its prior approval.
3.
The election period which it fixed for
the May 10, 2010 election is valid and legal pursuant to its authority under
Section 3 of BP 881.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC validly issued Resolution No. 8737 that defined
transfer, as contemplated under Section 261(h) of BP 881, to include all
personnel action including reassignments; And if so, whether or not the COMELEC
validly found prima facie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution No.
8737 in relation to Section 261(h).
Ruling:
A.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 is valid
1. The COMELEC’s enforcement and administration power
and rule-making power. Expressly, the Constitution and the
laws grant the COMELEC with the power, first and foremost, to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election," and second, to "promulgate rules and regulations."
Together, these powers ensure that the COMELEC is well armed to properly enforce
and implement the election laws and enable it to fill in the situational gaps
which the law does not provide for or which the legislature had not foreseen. In
exercising these powers and fulfilling its mandate, the COMELEC, in addition,
must necessarily interpret the provisions of the law that they are to enforce
and for which they will craft the guidelines. The exercise of these powers
should always be read in conjunction with, not in isolation from, the
Constitution and the laws from where it draws the power.
2. The COMELEC did not exceed the exercise of its
rule-making power;
reassignment is included in the prohibition pursuant to the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" The court agrees with the questioned COMELEC interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever."
reassignment is included in the prohibition pursuant to the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" The court agrees with the questioned COMELEC interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever."
a. The
COMELEC’s interpretation, pursuant to our Regalado ruling, is consistent with
the constitutional and legislative intent. In Regalado, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, Court declared that the terms transfer and detail are
modified by the term whatever such that "any movement of personnel from
one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during the
election period is covered by the prohibition." Any personnel action, when
caused or made during the election period, can be used for electioneering or to
harass subordinates with different political persuasions. The interpretation
that includes any form of personnel action, such as reassignment, within the
coverage of the phrase precisely guards against any such electioneering and
political harassment situations.
b. Its
interpretation is also consistent with basic statutory construction rules: 1) That a
word, phrase or provision in a statute should be construed not in isolation
with but in relation to the whole law. 2) That the words of a statute
are to be understood in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and the
signification that they have in common use, and are to be given their ordinary
meaning, unless otherwise specifically provided. 3) That special legal
provisions prevail over general ones. The treatment by the laws governing
the civil service of the terms "transfer, detail and reassignment" as
distinct modes of personnel action does not and cannot control the
interpretation of laws dealing with election and election offenses, including
the interpretation of Section 261(h) of BP 881, unless otherwise specifically
provided.
3. The "120-day before and 30-day after"
election period was validly fixed by the COMELEC pursuant to its rule-making
power. As a general rule, the period of election starts at
90 days before and ends 30 days after the election date pursuant to Section 9,
Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. This rule, however,
is not without exception. Under these same provisions, the COMELEC is not
precluded from setting a period different from that provided thereunder. In
this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May 10, 2010 Elections
at 120 days before and 30 days after the day of the election. Resolution No.
8737, through which the COMELEC fixed this alternate period of election, is
valid as it was issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s valid exercise of its
rule-making power (under Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution and
Section 52[c] of BP 881) and complied with the publication requirement as it
was published twice in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and in the Daily Tribune.
B. The
facts and the clear terms of the law does not support the COMELEC’s prima facie
finding of violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP
881
Under Section 261(h) of BP 881, a person commits the
election offense of violation of the election transfer ban when he makes or
causes the transfer or detail whatever of any official or employee of the
government during the election period absent prior approval of the COMELEC. By
its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its
exceptions. The elements are: 1. the
making or causing of a government official or employee’s transfer or detail
whatever; 2. the making or causing of the transfer or detail whatever was made
during the election period; and 3. these acts were made without the required
prior COMELEC approval.
Make
is defined as "to cause to exist. To do, perform, or execute; as to make
an issue, to make oath, to make a presentment. To do in form of law; to perform
with due formalities; to execute in legal form; as to make answer, to make a
return or report. To execute as one’s act or obligation; to prepare and sign;
to issue; to sign, execute, and deliver.” Cause, on the other hand, is defined
as "each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and
brings about an effect or result. A reason for an action or condition x x x x
an agent that brings about something. That which in some manner is accountable
for condition that brings about an effect or that produces a cause for the
resultant action or state." The terms make and cause indicate one and the
same thing – the beginning, the start of something, a precursor; it pertains to
an act that brings about a desired result. If we read these definitions within
the context of Section 261(h) of BP 881, the legal prohibition on transfer or
detail undoubtedly affects only those acts that go into the making or causing
or to the antecedent acts. Any act that occurs or is performed after the
antecedent act of making or causing or those acts performed to carry out an
event or result desired by the antecedent acts, such as the actual or physical
act of transferring, are no longer the concern of the legal prohibition.
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case based on
the following facts: First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the
concerned PHIC officers and employees before the election period. Second,
Aquino sent out, via the PHIC’s intranet service, the reassignment order to all
affected PHIC officers and employees before the election period. Third, the
reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it enumerated clearly the
affected PHIC officers and employees as well as their respective places of
reassignments, and was made effective immediately or on the day of its issue,
which was likewise before the election period. Fourth, the subsequent orders
that Aquino issued were not reassignment orders per se contrary to the
COMELEC’s assessment. Rather, they were, in fact, simply either orders of
retention, i.e., orders addressed to the incumbent officer-occupant of the
affected position to effectively maintain the status quo and continue
performing the duties of the position while the reassigned officer or employee
had not yet assumed or had been refusing to assume the position and its duties;
or orders of temporary discharge of additional duties, i.e., orders addressed
to the officer occupying the position next in rank to discharge the duties of
the affected position while the reassigned officer or employee had not yet
assumed or had been refusing to assume the position and its duties. These
subsequent orders could not be covered by the legal prohibition on transfers or
detail.
In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when, firstly, it used wrong or irrelevant considerations when it sought to
hold Aquino liable for violation of Section 261 (h) for issuing orders that
were clearly not for reassignment, but which were simply orders for retention
of position or orders for temporary discharge of additional duties. Secondly,
the COMELEC also went beyond the clear contemplation and intention of the law
and of existing jurisprudence when it included within the prohibition's
coverage the implementation aspect of the reassignment process - acts that were
obviously no longer within his active and immediate control and beyond the
ambit of making or causing to which the prohibition applies.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
