REPUBLIC - v - LAO


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. ALEXANDRA LAO, respondent.
G.R. No. 150413
July 1, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
1.       On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of 9,349 square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529/ Property Registration Decree.
2.       Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
3.       In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141/ Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessor’s open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years.
4.       On June 28, 1996, the trial court approved the application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529.
5.       Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
6.       Hence, this petition for review.



Issues:
(a)    whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and
(b)    whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.

Held: Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that:
(a)    he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and
(b)    the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

A.     Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Candido Amoroso, respondent’s first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and that it was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to support his claim. Respondent submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of the required period. Respondent’s other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the property since he was 10 years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his information on Edilberto’s ownership of the land on the fact that the latter used to greet him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on admitted that he did not know with certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and possessor of the property.

Respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing the transfer of the land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the relationship between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale between her and the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent cannot tack her possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most, respondent’s possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed possession of the property.

Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.

B.      Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding the classification of the property. These documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show that the property involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land being registered is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public domain.

It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive act from the government. It cannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.

Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.