ARRASTRE INC - v - VILLAFLOR, CA
Facts:
4.
On
January 1994, while the 90-day hold-over authority was in effect, petitioner
filed with respondent mayor an application for the renewal of one of its
Business Permit but was denied.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
1.
Roble
Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator, authorized by the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide and render arrastre and stevedoring
services at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, and on all vessels berthed
thereat.
2.
For
the years 1992 and 1993, petitioner was granted Business Permits by Villaflor
as Municipal Mayor of Hilongos, Leyte.
3.
On
December 1993, pending final consideration of petitioner’s application for
renewal with the PPA Office, Manila, the PPA through its Port Manager Reyna of
the Tacloban Port Management Office issued a 90-day hold-over authority to
petitioner which shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier
permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or sooner withdrawn or
cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA A.O. 10-81.
5.
Arraste
filed with the RTC, a Petition for Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against respondent mayor, raising the primary ground that the
refusal to issue the business license sought for was a neglect to perform an
act which the law enjoins her to do, by virtue of the office she occupies.
Arguments:
a.
the
source of the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is Section 444(b)(3)(iv)6 of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which is merely for the purpose of revenue
generation and not regulation, hence, the municipal mayor has no discretion to
refuse the issuance of a business license following the applicant’s payment
or satisfaction of the proper license fees.
b.
Petitioner further alleged that it is the PPA
which is vested with the discretion to determine whether a party can render
arrastre service in a particular port area.
c.
It
was granted by the PPA a five-year contract to provide cargo handling and other
related services at the Port of Hilongos, Leyte, effective 1 March 1994.
6.
Respondent
mayor invoked Municipal Resolution No. 93-27,10 passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
of Hilongos, Leyte which prohibits any party which operates shipping lines
plying the route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice versa, from engaging in arrastre
and stevedoring services at the port of Hilongos.
7.
RTC:
PPA has the sole authority to grant permits in the operation of cargo handling
services in all Philippine ports, whether public or private. Refusal of
respondent mayor was not based on law nor upon her discretion. Ruled in favor
of the Petitioner.
8.
CA:
Reversed and set aside RTC Decision. The pursuit of the duty of respondent
mayor under Section 444(b)(3)(iv)24 of the LGC necessarily entails the exercise
of official discretion. Municipal governments, thru its chief executive, are
endowed with the authority to exercise police power to ascertain which will
better serve their constituents who elected them into office.
Issue:
WON CA validly interpreted LGC 1991, as a grant of police power and full
discretion to the respondent mayor to refuse the issuance of the permit despite
due compliance of all documentary requirements and full payment of the required
permit fees
Held: YES.
-
The
writ of mandamus serves to compel a respondent who fails to perform a legal
duty or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or
office to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner. Mandamus is issued to command the performance of a ministerial, but
not a discretionary duty.
-
Section
444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides, thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance
the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:
x x x x
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources
and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans,
program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this
Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial
development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
x x x x
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke
the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. (Italics supplied.)
-
The
power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, known as the general welfare clause.
-
Section
444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the
respondent mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a
manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation. The
exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial.
-
As
to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within
the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
-
It
may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is not an ordinance but merely a
resolution. Still, the proper action is certiorari to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion had been committed on the part of respondent mayor in the
refusal to grant petitioner’s application. Petitioner’s petition for mandamus
is incompetent against respondent mayor’s discretionary power.
Notes:
1.
Main prayer of the
complaint is moot and academic but was decided because it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. A new application is necessary for the year 1995
and the year 1996 which is about to end.
2.
A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter.
3.
"Discretion,"
when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon
them by law or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by
the judgment or conscience of others.
4.
If the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.
