In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of EDILION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
EN BANC, A.M. No.
1928 August 3, 1978, CASTRO, C.J.
Doctrine: The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers. The practice of
law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines. In 1975, IBP Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In
the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues"
to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
The respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the IBP are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects
to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A — in accordance with which the
Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws. Section 10 of the Court Rule reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court
to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter
is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
Issue: Whether or not Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
IBP are unconstitutional or illegal.
Ruling:
No. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar,
to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer
of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
The most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality
and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of
the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397.
Even without the enabling Act and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in
all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. When
the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large,
were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities
for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon should is hereby disbarred, and
his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
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First objection posed by
the respondent: Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate
(and not to associate).
Court: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not
make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became
a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does
in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
Second objection posed
by the respondent: Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void.
Court: Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration.
Third objection posed by
the respondent: The enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and
hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Court: The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
Fourth objection posed
by the respondent: The power and/or
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll
of Attorneys.
Court: The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5)
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the
legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
