ESTEBAN - v - MARCELO
MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN (in substitution of the deceased
GABRIEL O. ESTEBAN), Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
RODRIGO C. MARCELO and CARMEN T. MARCELO, Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 197725, July 31, 2013, BRION, J.
Doctrine:
1. The
one-year prescription period is
counted from the last demand to
pay and vacate.
2. Any
one of the co-owners may bring
an action for ejectment.
Facts:
The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son,
petitioner Mark Anthony Esteban, had been in possession of a piece of land
located at Mandaluyong City, since the 1950s. In the 1960s, the late
Esteban's sister constructed a foundry shop at the property. In the 1970s,
after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, the respondents-spouses
Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly rental
fee. Since 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee. In
2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the respondents-spouses a demand
letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate within 5 days from
receipt thereof. For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to
vacate, the late Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the
respondents-spouses on December 2005.
In its April 2009 decision, the MeTC ruled
against the respondents-spouses. On appeal, RTC fully affirmed the MeTC
ruling.
In its January 2011 decision, the CA reversed
the RTC. The CA ruled that from the year of dispossession in 2001 when the
respondents-spouses stopped paying rent, until the filing of the complaint for
ejectment in 2005, more than a year had passed; hence, the case no longer
involved an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC, but an accion
publiciana that should have been filed before the RTC. Therefore, the
MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case so that its decision was a nullity.
Issue: Whether or not
the case involves an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC. Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The one-year prescription period is counted from the
last demand to pay and vacate. There should first be a demand to pay or to
comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful
detainer arises. The Revised Rules of Court clearly so state. Since 1947,
case law has consistently upheld this rule. "Mere failure to pay rents
does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to
vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and
tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of
possession." In cases where there were more than one demand to
pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful
detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose to waive his
cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in the premises.
Any one of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment. While all co-owners are real parties in interest in suits to
recover properties, anyone of them may bring an action for the recovery of
co-owned properties. Only the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery
of the co-owned property becomes an indispensable party thereto; the other
co-owners are neither indispensable nor necessary parties.
