De la Viña - v - Villareal
Facts:
2.
Subsequently, Narcisa presented motion she had
personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the
property which belonged to the conjugal partnership and prayed for a
preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining and
prohibiting him in the premises. De la Viña filed a demurrer which was denied.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
1.
1917 Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the
CFI Iloilo against Diego de la Vina, alleging:
1.
petioner: resident of Iloilo, defendant:
resident of Negros Oriental
2.
legitimate wife of defendant
3.
1988 maried in Negros Oriental
4.
lived as husband and wife; had 9 children, 3
already of age; petitioner and defendant acquired property (real and personal)
P300,000 under administration of defendant
5.
1913 up to present defendant committing adultery
with Ana Calog
6.
because of such she was rejected out of the
conjugal home; thus lived in Iloilo
7.
is being supported by one of her daughters
She
prays for a
1.
divorce
2.
partition of conjugal property
3.
alimony pendente lite in sum of P 400/month
3.
Thus this petition for certiorari alleging that
1.
Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge
CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a certain action for
divorce instituted by the respondent Narcisa
2.
judge has exceeded his power and authority in
issuing, in said action, a preliminary injunction against the said petitioner
prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property
during the pendency of the action
3.
all the
proceedings were null and void.
Issue:
1.
WON a married woman ever acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the
marriage? YES
2.
WON, in an action for divorce, brought by the
wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is
also prayed for, the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband
restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the
conjugal property during the pendency of the action? YES
Held/Ratio: DENIED.
1.
As a general principle of law, the domicile of
the wife follows that of her husband. This is not an absolute rule. Article 40
of the Civil Code (used by petitioner) Scaevola comments: 'Although article 64
of the Law of Civil Procedure provides that the domicile of a married woman,
not legally separated from her husband is that of the latter, yet, when the
tacit consent of the husband and other circumstances justify it, for the
purposes of determining jurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman
should be considered as her domicile where her right may be exercised in
accordance with article 63." Manresa comments: xxx when married women as
well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of
their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they
have their own independent domicile, which should be considered in determining
jurisdiction in cases of provisional support, guardianship of persons,
etc." A married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from
that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where the husband
has given cause for divorce.
2.
Petioner: articles 1412 and 1413 of the Civil
Code: the husband is the manager of the conjugal partnership and, as such, is
empowered to alienate and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of
the wife. Court: The law making the husband the sole administrator of the
property of the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and convenience
as well as upon the presumption that, from the very nature of the relation
between husband and wife, the former will promote and not injure the interests
of the latter. So long as this harmonious relation, as contemplated by law,
continues, the wife cannot and should not interfere with the husband in his
judicious administration of the conjugal property. But when that relation
ceases and, in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to
partition the conjugal property, it is but just and proper, in order to protect
the interests of the wife, that the husband's power of administration be
curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or
encumbering the conjugal property is concerned.
Note: I made this case digest when I was still a law student. The ones posted on my blog were not due for submission as part of any academic requirement. I want to remind you that there is no substitute to reading the full text of the case! Use at your own risk.
