CHAVEZ - v - JBC, ESCUDERO, TUPAS
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH
G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 202242, April 16,
2013, MENDOZA, J.
Doctrine: In
opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative
of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one seat in the JBC. Had the intention been
otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as
can be read in its other provisions.
Facts:
The present action stemmed from the
unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona in 2012, and the
nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory
pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine the following: 1. whether the first paragraph of Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one member of Congress
to sit in the JBC; and 2. if the practice of having two representatives from
each House of Congress with one vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
The Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the that the
current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Framers carefully worded Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8.
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the
JBC, Congress designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of
the ex-officio members. Pursuant to the constitutional provision that
Congress is entitled to one representative, each House sent a representative to
the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation. In 1994, the
seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth
member was added to the JBC as the two representatives from Congress began
sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half of a vote. In
2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives one full vote each. It has been the situation since then.
Issue: Whether or not the grounds relied upon by
Respondents: “1] that allowing only one
representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its
bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper
adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a
plain oversight” are tenable.
Held: No.
The Court cannot accede to the argument
of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated
in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter
"a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino
people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one seat
in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in
no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions. Thus,
to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by
sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the
legislature, is not persuasive enough. It is very clear that the Framers were
not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC
because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC
was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one
whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
In the creation of the JBC, the Framers
arrived at a unique system by adding to the four regular members, three
representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as
ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of
Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the
Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven, not
eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature,
not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence
to it as a major branch of government. To allow Congress to have two
representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle
of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution. Two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members
to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered
membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution.
The argument that a senator cannot
represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is
misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of
Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows
the scheme of splitting the said vote into half, between two representatives of
Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting
process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized.
After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done
directly cannot be done indirectly.
